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Abstract
Simulation models and theory prove that emission trading converges to market
equilibrium. This paper sets out to falsify these results using experimental economics.
Three experiments are conducted for the six largest carbon emitting industrialized
regions. Two experiments use auctions: the first a single-bid auction and the second a
Walrasian auction. The third relies on bilateral, sequential trading. The paper finds that,
in line with the standard theory, both auctions and bilateral, sequential trading capture a
significant part (88 to 99 percent) of the potential cost savings of emission trading. As
expected from dynamic trade theory, all experiments show that the market price
converges (although not fully) to the market equilibrium price. In contrast to the theory,
the results also suggest that not all countries will gain from trading. In both the bilateral
trading experiment and the Walrasian auction, one country will actually be worse off
with trade. In particular, bilateral, sequential trading leads to a distribution of gains
significantly different from the competitive market outcome. This is due to speculative
behavior, imperfect foresight and market power.
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1Testing the dynamic theory of emissions trading: experimental evidence
for global carbon trading
Ger Klaassen, Andries Nentjes and Mark Smith
1. Introduction
There is general agreement among environmental economists that emission trading is well
suited to restrict the emissions of a uniformly dispersed pollutant such as CO2 emissions
(Tietenberg, 1985; Klaassen, 1996). The idea that international emission trading between
parties creates flexibility, and thus allowing lower total abatement costs, has been the basis for
incorporating emissions trading in the Kyoto protocol. Numerous publications have calculated
the expected cost savings of international carbon trading, taking into account different market
structures and restrictions on trade (see Yamin et al., 2001 for a survey). The common
characteristic of these simulation studies is that they use a static framework and assume
market equilibrium will be realized.
Assuming well-behaved emission abatement cost functions, initial grandfathering of emission
permits and price taking behavior of trading parties, the proof that an emission market
equilibrium exists is relatively straightforward (Montgomery, 1972). However, it leaves the
question unanswered whether starting from disequilibrium and in a context where bilateral
trades are made sequentially at changing non-equilibrium prices, the market indeed converges
to an equilibrium. Recently, Ermoliev et al. (2000) tackled this problem and proved that
sequential bilateral trading of emissions converges to a cost minimizing emissions market
equilibrium. The trading scheme only requires sources to bilaterally state their demand price
(as buyers) and supply price (as sellers), and agree on price and quantity in bilateral
negotiations and contracts. This reflects what is done in existing markets, where brokers have
an important function in bringing together the relevant information.
If emission reductions are implemented immediately by sources after each round of trade,
they are tied up into sunk cost. These sources may not be willing to participate in subsequent
rounds of trades, which may require reversing earlier decisions on emission levels. If so, the
result will not be cost-efficient. Therefore, the dynamic market model, as specified by
Ermoliev et al. (2000) assumes reversibility before irreversible real decisions are taken, by
separating the price formation stage from the actual implementation stage.
An alternative to a decentralized search for the cost-effective vector of emissions is a
Walrasian auction of emission permits (Ermoliev et al, 2000). Such an auction also results in
minimizing total emission control cost. The auction consists of two stages: a search stage, in
which the auctioneer searches for the equilibrium price; and a second stage, in which
transactions are made at the market equilibrium prices. The search stage is opened by the
auctioneer who announces the permit price. Each participant then knows the price to pay for
an extra unit of emission reduction or to receive for each additional unit of emission
reduction. If the price is higher than the participant’s current marginal cost, he will decide to
2reduce his emissions below his initial emissions level and sell permits. He will inform the
auctioneer how many emission permits he wants to sell. On the other hand, when the emission
price is below the marginal cost of emission reduction, the source has an incentive to increase
its planned emissions; it will state its demand for emission permits. The auctioneer then
calculates market demand and revises the price upwards when demand exceeds supplies and
downward when supply exceeds demand. It should be noted that sources have to state only
the number of permits they are willing to sell or to buy at the price proposed by the
auctioneer. Only the auctioneer has knowledge of demand and supply for permits. The
procedure converges to an equilibrium with cost efficient emissions.
The above theoretical contributions to the dynamics of emission markets may be logically
correct, that does not mean they are also true. The real world can differ from what theory
predicts. The purpose of this article is to falsify the theory using the methods of experimental
economics and apply these to international carbon trading under the Kyoto Protocol.
Analyzing proposed policies in which critical institutional design issues confront policy
makers is an obvious task for experimental methods (Smith, 1994; Issac and Holt, 1999).
Experimental methods have been used to examine policy proposals ranging from electricity
rate design (Elliott et al., 2000) to scheduling cargo regimes on the space shuttle (Banks et al.,
1989). Following Montgomery’s (1972) seminal theoretical work on emissions trading,
experiments on mechanisms for trading emissions permits began with the work of Plott
(1983). With the passage of the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990 by the U.S. Congress,
experimenters had a real market to help design. Funded by the U.S. Department of Energy,
teams at the University of Colorado and University of Arizona began to work on auction
mechanisms and permit allocation schemes, which eventually led to the U.S. Environmental
Protection Agency (EPA) sponsored auction for sulfur dioxide (Bjornstad et al., 1999).
Contributors to Issac and Holt’s (1999) edited volume on emissions permits experiments
addressed potential problems for the U.S. sulfur dioxide program including speculation
(Cason et al., 1999), market power (Godby, 1999) and permit banking (Cronshaw and Kruse,
1999a and 1999b). With the adoption of the Kyoto Protocol in 1997, the potential for trading
greenhouse gases has now taken on an international dimension.
Our carbon emissions trading experiments differ from the existing literature (Bohm, 1997;
Bohm and Carlé, 1999; Baron and Cremades, 1999; Soberg, 2000) and laboratory evidence on
emission quota trade in the following ways:
• Information on source pollution control costs is not regarded to be common
knowledge, not even within a certain range of uncertainty; sources have only private
information on their own cost function;
• Both bilateral sequential trading and auction mechanisms are tested.
The structure of the paper is as follows. Section 2 describes the design of the experiment.
Section 3 presents the results and section 4 concludes.
2. Design
2.1. Introduction
The purpose of the experiment is to gain understanding of how emissions trading might work
in practice and how markets for carbon emission reductions (including price developments)
3would evolve over time. For this purpose, information has been made available to the
participants in two forms: common knowledge and private knowledge. Common knowledge
consists of information on the Kyoto Protocol, knowledge on emissions trading and the
concept of marginal abatement costs as well as on the specific rules guiding emissions trading
in this experiment. Abatement cost functions for individual countries are regarded as private
information. We will first discuss these types of knowledge and then we proceed to discuss
the two sets of trading rules used to guide the auction and the bilateral trading experiment.
Common knowledge
At the Conference of the Parties in Kyoto, Japan at the end of 1997 a number of countries
agreed to reduce their emissions of a number of greenhouse gases among them CO2. The
industrialized countries (Annex I countries) agreed in principle to reduce their emissions
during the period 2008-2012. These targets are country specific and are specified as
percentage reductions compared to the base year (in general 1990). Countries have the option
to meet their targets through reductions in domestic emissions. The draft protocol however
also includes a number of so called flexibility mechanisms. Among them is emission trading.
Emission trading allows (Annex I) countries to meet their targets by purchasing emission
reductions from other countries with quantitative targets. The amount bought from other
countries would be reduced from their own target. Buying emission reductions from other
countries is financially attractive where it is cheaper to buy emission reductions from other
countries than reduce domestic emissions. A country that sells emission reductions to another
country must make sure that it meets its agreed target plus the additional emission reductions
it agreed to sell to other parties. In the remainder of the report, we will assume that countries
agreed to meet their target in 2010.
In the experiment the goal of each country team is to achieve the emission target for the
country as agreed in Kyoto at minimum costs. Countries can achieve this goal by either
reducing emissions domestically or buying emission reductions from other countries. Total
cost consists of the costs of domestic emission control plus the cost of buying emission
reductions elsewhere minus the revenues received from selling emission reductions.
Emission trading takes place only between six countries or country regions: Japan, Central
and Eastern Europe (CEE, which includes the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia,
Bulgaria and Rumania), the EU-15, Russia, the Ukraine and the USA. It is common
knowledge among these negotiating teams that the marginal costs of meeting the Kyoto target
are relatively high in the EU, Japan and the USA and are relatively low in the CEE, Russia
and the Ukraine.
Table 1 gives the assumed emission targets for the year 2010 as well as the base year
emissions for 1990. The 1990 emissions are energy related carbon emissions only and are
based on the model used to derive the abatement cost-functions (Gusbin et al., 1999). The
absolute targets for the year 2010 are slightly rounded.
A generic cost function was shown and discussed with the participants to ensure a proper
understanding of the function.
4Table 1: Emission targets and reductions in 2010.
Emissions in 1990 Reduction in 2010 Emission target in 2010
MtC % of 1990 MtC
USA 1411 6 1325
EU 946 8 867
Japan 319 7 295
Russia 650 0 650
Ukraine 178 0 178
CEE 284 6 267
Total 3788 5 3582
Private information
Information on regional (country) cost functions was only given to the participants
representing that specific country. Countries thus only possessed (perfect) knowledge on their
own carbon abatement costs. The cost function was supplied several days before the
experiment was run. Each negotiating team had to study its own domestic cost function and
the domestic marginal costs for meeting its agreed emission reduction target. It also had to
decide whether it should buy or sell and at which possible price. The team was also instructed
to keep track of the emission reductions sold to and bought from other countries to remain
informed on the level of domestic reductions (still) needed to meet the Kyoto target. The cost
functions used in the experiment were based on the POLES model (see Gusbin et al., 1999).
The cost functions for Russia and Ukraine were derived from the POLES cost function for the
Former Soviet Union using additional information on energy and related carbon emissions in
these countries (see Victor et al, 1998).
Trading rules
In total, three trading experiments with three different types of market design, and three
different groups of participants were carried out, with two groups of students from Colorado
College (USA) and one group from Groningen University (The Netherlands). The three
trading schemes were:
1. Bilateral, sequential trading;
2. Single-bid auction; and
3. Auction with a tâtonnement process in which tentative market clearing prices are
called out.
Group 1 followed a process of bilateral trading. Each country was free to choose a trading
partner and negotiate the terms of trade (volume and price). If agreement had been reached,
then the trading authority had to be informed. In this case, information on prices and traded
volumes of individual trades was regarded as private information and not made available to
other parties. The trading scheme resembles the scheme investigated by Ermoliev et al (2000).
The difference is that Ermoliev et al. supposed that participants would only have information
on prices in their last bilateral trade. In our experiment, more information was available since
the trading authority announced, at regular intervals the total volumes traded and the average
price on the market. This, of course being more in line with current practice in the US
regarding sulfur trading where brokers supply information on average prices of bilateral
trades (Joskow et al., 1998).
5Group 2 traded with the use of an auctioneer. The auctioneer collected written bids for selling,
and offers for buying emission reductions from the countries, and at regular intervals
determined equilibrium prices and quantities. The auctioneer constructed the (piece-wise
linear) supply and demand curve in each single round based on the bids and offers for that
round and determined the equilibrium price. Volumes were sold at the equilibrium price for
that round. This process of collecting bids and offers, and fixing a new equilibrium price was
repeated until the end of the negotiating period (after 2.5 hours). In this process, information
on equilibrium prices and volumes traded was made available to all participants.
Members of Group 3 participated in a Walrasian auction in which tentative market prices are
called out in the search stage. The price adjustment rule applied by the auctioneer was that the
percentage change in price was equal to [excess demand/ (sum of demand and supply)] x 100
percent. After a price was called out, participants submitted their bids (on closed leaflets) to
the auctioneer who made public total demand, total supply and the new price. The auction is
similar to the scheme discussed in Ermoliev et al. (2000).
In the three cases, trading took place during one morning or afternoon and was finalized after
2.5 hours. Each participant of the winning team obtained a reward in kind. The winning team
was the team that achieved the highest cost savings relative to the potential savings under the
competitive market equilibrium. This took into account the fact that the potential gains (in
absolute dollars) of some countries were much bigger since these countries emitted more, had
a more beneficial initial allocation of emission targets or had lower marginal costs. In the two
US experiments in addition to this 10 percent of the grade for the course depended on
participation in the experiment and on the extent to which the participant's team achieved the
potential cost savings of its country. Finally, bilateral contracts agreed could not be annulled
and bids and offers made for auctions could not be withdrawn.
3. Results
3.1. Introduction
This section presents the results of the experiments. First we will introduce the potential cost
savings of emission trading that would result from a static perfect, competitive equilibrium
situation. These results will than serve as reference point for discussing the actual costs
savings as well as their distribution for the three emission trading mechanisms.
Perfect market equilibrium
Table 2 shows the cost savings that would result under a perfect equilibrium if one makes the
usual assumptions of perfect information, absence of transaction cost and price taking
behavior. In this situation, the market equilibrium price would be $38.7/ton carbon (tC).
376 million tons C (MtC) would be exchanged in arriving at the equilibrium starting from the
initial allocation of permits. Without trade, the Kyoto Protocol would cost $36.05 billion.
Trading allows cost savings of $28.4 billion, a seventy nine percent reduction in compliance
costs. The potential cost savings (in absolute terms) would be highest in Russia (around $8
billion) followed by Japan and the EU. The large potential Russian gain is due to the high
levels of emissions in Russia, the initial allocation of permits and the fact that, even without
6explicit pollution control, carbon emissions in Russia are expected to be lower than their
agreed target in 2010 as a result of industrial restructuring.
Table 2: Cost savings under the market equilibrium.
Marginal
costs
Kyoto $/tC
Marginal costs
optimum $/tC
Kyoto total
abatement
costs million $
Equilibrium total
abatement costs
million $
Potential net
cost savings
million $a
Emissions
after trade
MtC
Traded
Amount
MtCc
USA 75 38.7 12988 3901 2805 1487 162
EU 125 38.7 12325 1732 5348 1003 136
Japan 250 38.7 10738 549 7178 373 78
Russia 0 38.7 0 906 8049 419 -231
Ukraine 0 38.7 0 250 2217 114 -64
CEE 0 38.7 0 312 2803 187 -80
Sumb 38.70 36051 7650 28400 3582 376
aAbatement costs plus revenues from selling emission permits minus expenditures on selling emission permits
bSum of volume of emissions sold (or bought)
c+ indicates net demand, - indicates net supply
Bilateral trading experiment
Table 3 gives the costs savings resulting from the bilateral trading experiment. A number of
points are worth noting. The costs savings achieved are $27.3 billion. This is around
96 percent of the potential cost savings (compare Table 2). The distribution of the gains
(control cost savings plus revenues from selling emission reductions minus expenditures on
buying emissions reductions) differs significantly from the competitive equilibrium outcome
(Table 2); Ukraine, Russia and the CEE (the net sellers) gain much more (a factor 2 to 3) and,
more surprisingly, the EU even turns out to be a net looser. Especially the latter,
counterintuitive result begs an explanation.
Table 3: Cost savings bilateral trade.
Abatement Net trade Net costs Net gain Actual Emission Tradeda
Costs payments from trade gains after trade amounts
million $ million $ million $ million $ % of potential MtC MtC
USA 4062 6710 10772 2216 79 1445 120
EU 2484 13555 16039 -3714 -69 985 118
Japan 313 7375 7688 3050 42 380 85
Russia 0 -13665 -13665 13665 170 475 -175
Ukraine 863 -8100 -7237 7237 326 105 -73
CEE 1055 -5875 -4820 4820 172 192 -75
Sum 8777 0 3582 3
Cost savings 27273 96.0%
aSum depicts gross trade (all volumes sold or bought). Regional amounts are net trade (bought minus sold)
Table 4 assists in finding the explanation. Table 4 shows that 18 bilateral trades occurred with
a total volume of 348 MtC being traded. The weighted average price was nearly $86/tC. This
high average price is twice as high as the market equilibrium price of around $38/tC. The high
price is largely due to the fact that the EU bought 58 MtC from the Ukraine at a price of
$112/tC. Three explanations can be offered for this high price. First, the Ukraine and Russia
exerted market power and agreed secretly to not sell their permits below a certain price (of
around 110 $/tC). Secondly, although the EU team knew it was loosing money on this
particular deal it speculated that the price would increase and they could resell at a higher
price. Finally, the EU did not know when it bought from the Ukraine that both the CEE and
7the Ukraine had already made bilateral agreements to sell at much lower prices of $60
respectively $68/tC since this was private information. This means that Ukraine agreed a
cartel price with Russia but then cheated.
Table 4: Overview of bilateral trades.
Trade number Volume Price Expenditure
Model Mtc $/tC Seller Buyer million $
1 30 60 CEE Japan 1800
2 30 68 Russia USA 2040
3 58 112.07 Ukraine EU 6500
4 25 142 Russia EU 3550
5 20 90 Russia Japan 1800
6 20 110 Ukraine Japan 2200
7 25 115 Russia USA 2875
8 10 115 CEE EU 1150
9 15 105 CEE Japan 1575
10 10 105 CEE EU 1050
11 10 110 USA EU 1100
12 10 85 Russia Ukraine 850
13 35 42 Russia USA 1470
14 10 42 Russia EU 420
15 5 50 Ukraine USA 250
16 5 43 EU USA 215
17 20 33 Russia USA 660
18 10 30 CEE USA 300
Sum 348 85.65 29805
As can be seen from Figure 1 the EU expectations turned out to be wrong. The permit price
remained at a very high level during the first half of the bilateral trades. The price only started
dropping (even below the equilibrium price) during the last 6 trades. Remarkably, the lack of
price information had no significant effect on the overall efficiency although it did have
significant effects on the distribution of gains. This stands in sharp contrast to the usual
findings of economic theory and simulation models. However, the result is in agreement with
the dynamic market theory of Ermoliev et al. (2000), which predicts that prices and quantities
will converge towards the static market equilibrium price. Figure 2 shows that for all trading
blocks except Japan the prices move towards the optimum price of $38.7, although with
bumps, and after 18 rounds, the allocation of emissions has come close to the cost effective
allocation. The perhaps high prices paid by Japan should be compared with the extremely
high marginal costs of 250$/tC without trading which explains the interest of Japan pay
seemingly excessive high prices of over 100 $/tC. The largest discrepancies between bilateral
trading and the perfect market equilibrium show up for Ukraine with actual sales equal to
68 percent of the optimal sales and US with actual purchases equal to 74 percent of the
optimum.
80
20
40
60
80
100
120
140
160
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18
trade nr
$/t
o
n
C
.
Figure 1: Bilateral trade prices.
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Figure 2: Successive prices bilateral, sequential trading.
Single bid auction experiment
In the available time of 2.5 hours, only 4 successive auction rounds were possible. However,
in each round all parties could participate. At 98.5 percent of the potential cost savings, the
auction achieves cost savings slightly higher than those of the bilateral trading regime
9(Table 5). This is not so significantly different from the bilateral results. What does differ
significantly though is the distribution of gains (control cost saving + net revenue of permit
expenditures) over the countries involved. Table 5 shows that under the auction every country
stands to gain from trading. The Russian gains are slightly higher (a factor 1.4) than the gains
under the perfect market equilibrium and the EU gains are slightly lower than those in a
perfect market. The differences are much smaller than under the bilateral regime. The auction
does not only appear to fulfill an important role in creating an appropriate price signal but also
creates an environment that ensures a more even distribution of the gains from trade. This is
clearly due to the fact that price information is transparent and the development of prices
becomes more predictable (see Figure 3 and Table 6).
Table 5: Cost savings single bid auction.
Abatement Net trade Net costs Net gains Actual Emission Traded
costs payments from trade gains after trade amounts
million $ million $ million $ million $ % of potential MtC MtC
USA 3836 6800 10636 2352 84 1489 164
EU 2725 5940 8665 3660 68 980 113
Japan 313 4505 4818 5919 82 381 86
Russia 550 -11725 -11175 11175 139 430 -220
Ukraine 528 -2587.5 -2059 2059 93 109 -69
CEE 114 -2932.5 -2819 2819 101 193 -74
Sum 8067 0 3582 363
Costs
saved
27984 98.5%
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Figure 3: Prices at the single bid auction.
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Table 6: Overview of single bid auction results.
Trade Volume Price Expenditure
number MtC $/tC Seller Buyer million $
1 70 62.5 Russia 4375
2 38 62.5 Japan 2375
3 32 62.5 EU 2000
4 120 50 Russia 6000
5 21 50 Japan 1050
6 47 50 EU 2350
7 52 50 USA 2600
8 20 48.75 Russia 975
9 14 48.75 CEE 682.5
10 6 48.75 Japan 292.5
11 28 48.75 EU 1365
12 60 37.5 CEE 2250
13 10 37.5 Russia 375
14 69 37.5 Ukraine 2587.5
15 21 37.5 Japan 787.5
16 112 37.5 USA 4200
17 6 37.5 EU 225
Sum 363 47.61 17245
The auction price gradually drops from a level of $62/tC (auction 1) to a level of $50 to
$55/tC (auctions 2 and 3) to stabilize at a level of $38. This is slightly below the static
equilibrium price of $38.7/tC.
Walrasian repetitive auction experiment
Table 7 and Table 8 present two possible outcomes of the repetitive auction. Two outcomes
must be considered in this case because Ukraine oversold permits and a compliance problem
arises. After trade, it should reduce its emissions to 62.48 MtC, but only a reduction down to
88 million ton is technically feasible. In this case, the results depend on the effectiveness of
the non-compliance regime. In Table 7, it is assumed that total global emissions will exceed
the global emission target by 25.52 MtC, due to Ukraine overselling. The cost savings are
then 91.2 percent of the potential if one assumes that the marginal costs of the reductions
beyond the technically feasible minimum level are free (while sold without detection or
enforcement penalty). In the second case (Table 8), it is assumed, perhaps more realistically
that the buyers have to make additional emission reductions in proportion to their purchases to
compensate for Ukraine’s overselling. That implies that a total volume of around 26 million
ton of carbon emission permits sold by the Ukraine to the various buyers was invalidated. For
each buying country, a similar percentage (of the total volumes bought in the last auction) was
invalidated. As a result the global emission target is realized, but cost savings are a bit lower
under this buyer beware liability regime: 88 instead of 91 percent of the potential cost
savings. A comparison with Table 5 makes clear that the distribution of gains is also very
different from the results of the single bid auction.
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Table 7: Cost savings in the Walrasian auction if Ukraine overselling.
Abatement Net trade Net costs Net gains Actual Emission Traded
costs payments from trade gains after trade amounts
million $ million $ million $ million $ % of potential MtC MtC
USA 2816 6223 9039 3949 141 1518 193
EU 1326 4742 6068 6257 117 1014 147
Japan 449 2601 3050 7687 107 376 81
Russia 709 -7318 -6608 6608 82 423 -227
Ukraine 4450a -3732 718 -718 -32 62 -116
CEE 401 -2517 -2116 2116 75 189 -78
Sum 10151 0 3582
Costs saved 25889 91.2%
a.Assumes marginal costs of zero for each reduction beyond the technical minimum. If one assumes similar
marginal costs as the last technical feasible reduction abatement costs would be 13,389 million $ for the Ukraine
Net costs would be 5207 million $. Overall, costs saved would only be 16,950 million $ (or 59.7 percent of the
potential savings).
Table 8: Cost savings in the Walrasian auction without Ukraine overselling due to buyer
liability.
Abatement Net trade Net costs Net gains Actual Emission Traded
costs payments from trade gains after trade amounts
million $ million $ million $ million $ % of potential MtC MtC
USA 3214 5849 9058 3930 140 1506 181
EU 1642 4454 6095 6230 116 1005 138
Japan 637 2443 3079 7658 107 371 76
Russia 709 -7318 -6608 6608 82 423 -227
Ukraine 4450 -2907 1543 -1543 -70 88 -90
CEE 401 -2517 -2116 2116 75 189 -78
Sum 11052 0 3582
Costs saved 24998 88.0%
Table 9 shows how the price evolved in the six rounds that were necessary to detect the
market-clearing price of $32.7/tC. The initial price of $100 was set by the auctioneer.
Applying the price adjustment rule, the price was reduced to $30 in the second round and then
raised to $33 in the third round. Quite unexpectedly, demand increased enormously in the
third round in response to the higher price. In the reconstruction of events after the game, it
turned out that Ukraine had successfully tried to raise the price by coming out as a purchaser
instead of a seller. As a result, the price jumped up to $44 in the fourth round. Demand
dropped again because Ukraine was afraid that in the end it might have to conclude a
purchase contract at a rather high price instead of ending up as a seller. The price then
converged quite quickly to the market-clearing price of $32.2. The price is too low compared
to the perfect market equilibrium and total trade of 420 MtC (with Ukraine overselling) or
414 MtC (with buyer liability) is higher than the volume of 376 MtC that is efficient (see
Table 2). In the reconstruction, it appeared that after abandoning its strategy of driving up the
price Ukraine had made a calculation error in determining its optimal emission reduction and
sales, using a wrong baseline. Therefore, Ukraine supplied more than what would have been
efficient. Consequently, the price is lower than the efficient price and Ukraine itself is the
major victim. Table 7 and Table 8 show that Ukraine in the end has higher cost with emission
trade than without. Despite this ‘market failure’ carbon trading in Kyoto Protocol using the
Walrasian auction realized actual cost savings equal to 88 percent of the potential cost savings
(Table 8).
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Table 9: Bids in the Walrasian auction (with Ukraine overselling).
Auction
Round
Price
$/tC
Supply
MtC
Demand
MtC
Supply-demand
MtC
1 100 496 80 416
2 30 301.8 363.8 -62
3 33 305.3 500.3 -195.0
4 44 431.0 244.1 186.9
5 32 419.7 428.1 -8.4
6 32.3 420.0a 425.7 -5.7
aWith buyer liability supply of the Ukraine would be reduced by around 25.5 MtC reducing the total supply
down to 394.5 MtC.
4. Conclusions
This paper set out to examine the efficiency of bilateral, sequential trading and trading using
auctions so as to validate the conjectures of economic theory in a laboratory context. For this
purpose three experiments were run: one using bilateral, sequential trading and two using
auctions.
The paper finds that, in line with the standard theory, both the auctions and the bilateral,
sequential trading (with regular information on average prices) are able to capture a
significant part (88 to 99 percent) of the potential cost savings of emission trading (see
Table 10). In contrast to the usual findings, the results also suggest that not every country
might gain from trading. Under the bilateral trading regime, each participant realizes
substantial savings on control cost, but for some parties total expenditure turned out to be
higher than when emission trading is prohibited. This is due to combination of imperfect
information, speculative behavior and market power. The losses for one party are reflected in
windfall profits for others. Activities such as speculation, collusion and cheating played a role
especially in the bilateral trade experiment and in this respect behavior differed from the
assumptions in Ermoliev et al. (2000). Yet the prediction that bilateral trade will converge to
the cost-effective allocation is supported by the experimental evidence. The single bid auction
appears does not only to fulfill an important role in achieving the potential efficiency gains
from emissions trading but also serves to distribute the gains from emissions trading so that
they are closer to the expected equilibrium outcome. The Walrasian auction shows that
although the market clearing price was found quite quickly calculation errors, leading to non-
cost minimizing behavior of individual participants affect the actual total savings on
abatement cost and can make parties worse off than they would have been without trading. In
spite of this the distribution of the gains in the Walrasian auction differs less from the perfect
equilibrium than the distribution under bilateral, sequential trading. In the theoretical model of
Ermoliev et al., (2000), it was assumed that all parties calculate correctly and do not try to
affect the market price and therefore the market-clearing price is always the efficient price.
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Table 10: Summary of results.
Bilateral, sequential trade Single bid auction Walrasian Auctiona
Costs savings
% of potential savings
96 98.5 88
Distribution of gains
% of potential gainsb
- Highest
- lowest
326
-69
139
68
140
-70
aWith buyer-liability and Ukraine not overselling.
bMinus sign indicates net loss after permit trading.
Two points of discussion seem to be relevant. First, the fact that the distribution of the gains
from bilateral trading differs more from the perfect equilibrium outcome than under the
auctions might be relatively robust. Test runs of the bilateral trading scheme showed that the
winner gained twice as much as the perfect market solution and the country with the smallest
gains gained only 40 percent of the possible gains. In this case, only 76 percent of the
potential gains were realized. This suggests that the auctions might not only distribute gains
more evenly but may also be more efficient. Secondly, market power also occurred in the test
runs. Russia, CEE and the Ukraine colluded and initially, agreed not to sell below 125$/ton C.
This strengthens our conclusion that market power is an important factor to take into account
when designing the carbon market. We do point out however, that in reality the number of
sellers and buyers might be much bigger than in our experiment especially if developing
countries such as China and India participated, or permits were traded between companies
rather than countries. Thus, we might exaggerate the occurrence of market power. We do
think that this affects our major finding that both auctions and bilateral trading are likely to be
very efficient in practice and that the distribution of the gains might differ significantly from
the perfect equilibrium outcome, in especially under bilateral trading, due to market power,
speculation and imperfect foresight.
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